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The California pistachio industry led an initiative to establish a federal marketing order, 
which mandates quality standards and an inspection program to assure food safety and 
consistency in the quality of California pistachios.  We develop a stochastic dynamic 
simulation model of the pistachio market to investigate quantitatively the likely effects of 
such collective action enforced by government mandates.  Simulation results indicate 
that, across the full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was 
always favorable to the proposed policy.  The measured benefits to producers, the nation, 
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1.  Introduction  
The U.S. pistachio industry, which is located almost exclusively in California, has 
experienced phenomenal growth over the past thirty years.  The value of U.S. production 
of pistachios grew from about zero in 1976 to $333 million in 2002.  The U.S. share of 
the rapidly growing global pistachio industry has also increased.  Outside California the 
main pistachio growing region is the Middle East, including Turkey and especially Iran.  
In recent years, a group of California pistachio growers led an initiative to 
establish a federal marketing order that would mandate quality standards and an 
inspection program to assure consistency in the quality of California pistachios.  The 
main provisions of the proposed marketing order set standards and require the testing for 
quality and aflatoxin, a cancer-causing mold found in many nuts and grains.  Proponents 
argued that the marketing order would increase consumer confidence and reduce the 
chance of an aflatoxin event in the pistachio market, and thereby stimulate demand and 
enhance consumer benefits and producer returns.  Hearings were held in 2002.  In early 
2004, the proposal was supported by more than 90 percent of growers voting, and the 
marketing order is expected to be established in 2004. 
This paper includes background on the California pistachio industry and the food-
safety issues, a discussion of the rationale for collective action in the form of a marketing 
order that led to the development of the marketing order.  We then develop the dynamic 
stochastic simulation model and present results of the likely economic consequences of 
the pistachio marketing order.   2
2.  The California Pistachio Industry 
World production of pistachios has grown rapidly during the past 20 years, and U.S. 
production has increased as a share of that growing total
1.  Iran is still the largest 
producer, but the United States is established as the second-largest pistachio producer in 
the world, followed by Syria and Turkey, and is now the second-largest exporter after 
Iran.
2  
Almost all U.S. pistachios are produced in California.
3  California’s production 
has grown more than 200-fold since 1976, when its first commercial crop of 1.5 million 
pounds was harvested.  California produced a record crop of 302 million pounds in 2002, 
up from the previous record of approximately 242 million pounds in 2000.
4  The longer-
term trends have shown steadily growing acreage, yields, quantity, and value of 
production, and corresponding downward trends in prices, with important fluctuations 
around those trends.  We have also seen steady growth in California exports as a share of 
world trade, and California exports as a share of production.   
Total California pistachio acreage grew from 34,726 total acres in 1980 to 
106,000 total acres in 2002.  Normally it takes a pistachio tree 7-8 years to mature before 
                                                 
1 Statistical information in this section was supplied by the California Pistachio Commission unless 
otherwise noted. 
 
2 Iran’s exports peaked in 1996 when it exported 308 million pounds of pistachios, but fell to 127 million 
pounds in 1997, when Iranian pistachios were banned in the European Union because of aflatoxins.  Iranian 
exports returned gradually to near pre-ban levels in the following few years. 
 
3 In 2000, Arizona had 2,700 acres and produced 4 million pounds of pistachios, just 1.5 percent of national 
production in that year (Arizona Agricultural Statistical Service, AASS), and too small to have significant 
impacts on the national market for pistachios.  New Mexico had 391 acres of pistachios in 1999, less than 
half a percent of total acreage (New Mexico Agricultural Statistics, 2000). 
 
4 Pistachios exhibit alternate bearing with low yields tending to follow high yields, thus 2001 was a 
relatively low-yield, low-production year.  The yield cycle is an important factor in quantity produced, 
price received, total value of the crop, and gross revenue per bearing acre (Risk Management Agency 
(RMA), USDA).   3
it produces an economically significant crop, and 12-15 years to reach full potential 
(CPC).  Bearing acreage in 2002 was estimated by the California Agricultural Statistical 
Service (CASS) to be 83,000 acres, up 222 percent from 25,773 bearing acres in 1980.  
The growth in area and production has been steady for the past 22 years and is expected 
to continue, with non-bearing acreage having reached 23,000 acres in 2002 (CASS).  The 
value of the crop varies with the quantity produced.  The long-term trend is for increasing 
quantity, and increasing value of the crop, but falling returns per pound, reflecting the 
fact that supply has been growing faster than demand.  The trend for the past 22 years in 
price per pound (even in nominal terms) has been gradually downward from the high in 
1980 of $2.05 a pound to $1.11 per pound in 2002.  
3.  Food-Safety Issues and Aflatoxin in Pistachios  
Aflatoxin is the main issue behind the marketing order for California pistachios.  An 
event of aflatoxin poisoning in pistachios or some other product, or simply concern about 
the possibility of such an event, could have adverse effects on demand.
5   
Many produce-related food scares have occurred in recent years.  For the period 
from 1990 to 1999, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) lists 55 cases in 
the United States alone.  Two recent produce-related events include cantaloupes and 
Salmonella in 2000, 2001 and 2002 (Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services) as well as strawberries and cyclospora in 1996 (details can 
be found in Calvin, 2003.  An earlier well-known event demonstrating the public’s 
sensitivity towards food safety was the alar scare in apples in 1989 (Van Ravenswaay et 
                                                 
5 Aflatoxicosis is poisoning that results from ingestion of aflatoxins in contaminated food or feed.  In rich 
countries, aflatoxin contamination rarely occurs in foods at levels that cause acute aflatoxicosis in humans, 
but there have been important aflatoxin events in pistachios.  (Information here is taken from 
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~mow/chap41.html .) 
   4
al. 1991).
6  The main event that directly related to pistachios occurred in Europe.  Iranian 
pistachio imports were banned in the European Union in September 1997 because 
shipments exceeded allowed levels of aflatoxins (European Commission, 1998).   
4.  Rationale for Collective Action in Pistachio Markets 
Mandated collective action programs, such as the California Pistachio Commission and 
the proposed Federal marketing order for California pistachios, use the coercive powers 
of the state or federal government to oblige individual producers to participate and 
contribute assessments.  The programs are voluntary in the sense that their establishment 
requires the support of a sufficiently large majority of producers, but they do not require 
unanimous support and consumers, who pay a portion of the costs, do not have voting 
rights.  Even among producers, unlike truly voluntary collective action programs, such as 
cooperatives or clubs, once they have been established, these programs are mandatory for 
all producers of the commodity in the defined area.   
The conventional in-principle economic justification for the use of the 
government’s taxing and regulatory powers in this fashion is that there are collective 
goods within the industry – research, promotion, grade standards, packing regulations, 
public relations, and the like – that will be undersupplied otherwise.  In practice, whether 
the pistachio marketing order will yield net benefits to producers, consumers, the state, 
and the nation as a whole, will depend on the nature and extent of “public good” or 
“external” costs and benefits associated with minimum quality standards and mandatory 
testing for aflatoxin, along with the other provisions of the order, and the costs of 
implementing the program.   
                                                 
6 Additional studies of demand impact of food safety events and information on demand can be found in 
Smith, van Ravenswaay and Thompson (1988), Brown and Schrader (1991), Richards and Patterson (1999) 
and Piggot and Marsh (2004).    5
The regulations under the marketing order include various elements that have 
different types of public-good characteristics, some more easily justified than others.  
Standardized grades and packaging have a public good role in that they will reduce 
transaction costs (e.g., see Freebairn 1967, 1973).  An argument for quality regulation can 
be made where quality is hidden and the market can be spoiled as a result of the 
distortions in incentives to provide and communicate information about quality (e.g., 
Akerlof 1970).  The “public good” element is that when consumers experience the quality 
of pistachios from one supplier, this affects their subsequent demand for pistachios from 
other suppliers as well.  Especially in the case of a food quality issue, a bad experience 
associated with any pistachios will likely affect the whole industry and the impacts can be 
large and long lasting, but individual producers will not take these industry-wide 
consequences of their actions entirely into account.   
An industry-wide food safety issue could arise as a result of evidence of death or 
illness associated with consumption of pistachios containing aflatoxin.  As with other 
food scares, there may be consequences for demand experienced throughout the industry, 
not just by the firms directly responsible for the incidents in question.  The same type of 
market problem can arise even without a case of actual food poisoning.  It could result 
from an actual aflatoxin event involving the discovery of aflatoxin in excess of the 20 
parts per billion allowed by the Food and Drug Administration.  Even in the absence of 
an aflatoxin event in pistachios, there may be adverse effects on the pistachio market 
from the perception of such a threat based on adverse publicity associating aflatoxin with 
pistachios, for some other reason, such as when excess amounts are discovered in other 
products in the United States or anywhere else in the world.  Negative perceptions could   6
result from adverse attention to aflatoxin even if no excess amounts were discovered.  
Negative consequences could result from negative perceptions among final consumers 
resulting in their choosing not to purchase products, negative perceptions among market 
middlemen such as retailers resulting in their choosing not to stock a product that might 
be subject to recall or lawsuits, or from governments choosing not to allow products to be 
sold because of heightened concerns over food safety.  
Perceptions of a food quality problem are not specific to individual suppliers, but 
affect the industry in a collective way.  Therefore, the private incentive to assure high 
quality nuts that are perceived as safe does not reflect the full, industry-wide or public 
benefit of these actions.  In such cases, voluntary actions, motivated by private incentives 
will provide less safety and quality assurance than would be in the interest of the industry 
(and, perhaps, the general consuming public).  In this case, all farms and firms would 
benefit from a stronger reputation for pistachios in general, but their own actions cannot 
assure such a reputation, unless the rest of the industry matches those actions.  Individual 
farms and firms have the private incentive to keep their own direct costs low and invest 
less in safety testing and quality assurance than would be optimal from the view of the 
whole market, giving rise to a free-rider problem.  
Two characteristics of the pistachio market make the public good concerns 
particularly important in the context of food safety assurances and quality standards.  
First, as with many fresh fruits and nuts, there is little brand identification with 
pistachios.  Thus, a customer who has an unsatisfying experience with a purchase of 
pistachios or who hears negative news about the safety of consuming pistachios is 
unlikely to associate this with a specific brand or supplier.  Unlike branded, packaged   7
consumer items, any negative news would not just affect a specific supplier, but rather 
would affect the industry at large.  Second, many pistachio purchasers consume the 
product infrequently, purchase relatively small quantities, and have relatively little 
knowledge about pistachios.  One would therefore expect the industry-wide reaction to an 
aflatoxin event in pistachios to be large, compared with more familiar foods, especially in 
the context of food safety concerns.  The wholesale trade would be even more sensitive to 
an event if a recall were necessary.  Consequently, the pistachio industry has strong in-
principle reasons for acting collectively to assure industry-wide compliance with quality 
and food safety standards.  But this is only an in-principle case.  Whether collective 
action of this type would provide net benefits to the industry depends also on how 
effective the program would be in reducing the likelihood of a food scare, or its severity, 
and on the costs of the program.  
5.  A Simulation Model of the Impacts of the Pistachio Marketing Order 
The pistachio marketing order involves a cost borne in every year, aiming to reduce the 
odds and severity of a major negative shock to demand.  The criterion here involves 
comparing the year-by-year costs with the expected benefits from the change in the odds 
and severity of an episodic major negative shock to demand.  Consequently, rather than 
evaluate benefits and costs in a typical year, in the evaluation of the marketing order for 
California pistachios it is necessary to compare the expected values of costs and benefits 
over many years.  Hence, our analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed pistachio 
marketing order involves a stochastic dynamic simulation rather than the more typical 
comparative static analysis.   8
We simulate the markets for California pistachios and project production, prices, 
and allocation of pistachios for 50 years, beginning in the year 2000.  Yields vary over 
time to reflect alternate bearing and random influences.  Aflatoxin events also occur at 
random.  In our model, both the probability of an event and severity of the demand 
response to a given event are lower with the marketing order in place.  For each “draw” 
of a time series of future yields, we simulated the outcomes for economic variables in the 
industry with and without the marketing order in place.  By considering 100 draws of 
future time paths of yields, we were able to estimate the effects of the marketing order on 
measures of interest, for average values and the range of outcomes (or other measures of 
variability).  
We specified equations representing the domestic and export demands for 
pistachios, including storage demand, using estimates of elasticities and data on market 
shares, quantities and prices.  The proposed marketing order applies solely to the 
domestic market.  It imposes regulations, which entail costs of compliance with 
requirements for aflatoxin testing and meeting quality standards, borne in the first 
instance by processors, and other (relatively minor) costs to be financed by an assessment 
on processors.  The potential increases in demand, on average, relative to a scenario 
without a marketing order include the effects of (1) a reduced probability of a negative 
shock to demand associated with an aflatoxin event and a reduction in the size of the 
negative shock associated with a given event, and (2) an increase in demand in every year 
owing to greater consumer confidence in the product and greater buyer confidence in the 
product associated with the USDA testing and certification.     9
Supply, Demand, Price and Market Allocation 
The equations of the model are specified as linear forms, and they are 
parameterized using data on initial values of prices and quantities, assumptions about 
underlying proportional trends in demand and yield, and elasticities.  The initial data on 
prices and quantities are the average actual values for 1997-2001, expressed in 2003 
dollar terms, and these values do not vary across alternative simulations.  In recognition 
of uncertainty about the values for the elasticities and trend growth rates, as well as a set 
of base values we try alternative values, and examine the implications for findings.
7  
Long and sad experience reveals that it is surprisingly difficult to estimate useful 
elasticities of supply or demand for agricultural products, and the precision and 
robustness of the estimates is often low.  In this analysis, we place greater emphasis on 
introspection and calibration approaches rather than placing reliance on the direct use of 
econometrically estimated elasticities.  This is because we seek to measure long-run 
responses of the type that generally cannot be estimated directly, especially for perennial 
crops, and we have in mind to simulate policy change that goes outside the range of past 
policy change.  In addition, we are dealing with an industry that is comparatively young, 
and has been growing comparatively quickly, such that fewer than 25 years of annual 
time-series data are available, and it could not be argued that the structure has been stable 
over the period, or that the market has been in long-run equilibrium.   
Models of supply response for perennial crops are reviewed in detail by Alston et 
al. (1995).  The more theoretically defensible models partition the supply response into 
separate equations representing elements of yield per bearing acre and the number of 
                                                 
7 A number of studies have estimated supply and demand elasticities for elements of the fruit, nut, and 
vegetable sector.  For instance, see Alston, et al. (1995, 1997, or 1998), or Huang (1985, 1993).   10
bearing acres (or other measures of the stock of bearing trees), with adjustments to 
bearing acreage reflecting removals of trees and plantings with a lag to reflect the time it 
takes for trees to mature and come into production.  In the case of pistachios, the trees are 
comparatively long-lived, and, given the relatively young industry in California, 
removals for replacement are not expected to have a substantial impact on the stock of 
trees over the period of our analysis.  We include in the model a fixed removal rate of 1 
percent per year, which is consistent with recent history, and we increase this rate to 2 
percent per year after 2015 to reflect increases in the average age of the bearing stock. 
Based on a knowledge of the pistachio industry and the literature, we take a fairly 
conventional approach and assume that the only supply response to price changes in our 
analysis is through plantings.  Specifically, plantings depend on the expected present 
value of revenue per acre over the life of the planting.  The equation for plantings is 
specified such that 
  ( ) 01 tt t PL a a E PV =+   (1) 
where PLt is the area of plantings of pistachios made in the year t, PVt is the present value 
in year t, over the life of the orchard, of gross revenue per acre for plantings made in the 
year t, Et denotes expectations formed in year t and a0 and a1 are the parameters of the 
equation
8.  
As a proxy for the expectations variable, in the absence of the marketing order, 
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8 The linear planting response is restricted to positive values, such that if the value implied by equation (1) 
is negative, a value of zero is given for the area of plantings in that year.   11
where Pt is the price per pound of pistachios, Yt is the yield per bearing acre of 
pistachios, and the product is thus average revenue per bearing acre of pistachios, all in 
the year t.  We used a value of 2.0 for the elasticity of plantings with respect to revenue 
per acre.
9  This value implies a modest rate of supply response to a change in incentives.  
To represent the impact of the marketing order on the supply of pistachios we modified 






(1 ) (1 ) t t tn tn tn
nn
EP V g R g P Y − −−
==
=+ =+ × ∑∑   (3) 
where g is the proportional increase in the present value of revenue per acre under the 
marketing order relative to the baseline, for the scenario in question (defined by the 
values for the elasticities, underlying growth in yields and demand, and marketing order 
impacts on demand) over the 50 year projection, 2000-2050.  This value is estimated for 
each scenario by simulating the stream of prices and yields with and without the 
marketing order, taking the annual average across the alternative yield streams, and then 
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where PV(R) denotes present value of revenue per bearing acre, superscripts M and B 
refer to the values under the marketing order and in the baseline, without the marketing 
order, and i is the real discount rate, set at 4 percent per annum.  A process of iteration is 
                                                 
9 In the very long run, pistachio acreage can continue to expand substantially, as it has in the past, and we 
could expect to see a very high supply response to a permanent and substantial price increase.  (Alston et al. 
1995 discuss this issue in relation to almonds, and the same arguments apply to pistachios.)  Intermediate 
figures apply to the current investigation.  However, we note that producers will only supply pistachios to 
the market at a price that is above the harvesting cost.  We use harvesting costs per pound of $0.12, based 
on University of California Cost and Returns studies (University of California Cooperative Extension).     12
used to solve for the value of g that is consistent with the model solutions it engenders, 
which results when the model solution stabilizes.  
Bearing acreage evolves according to  
  17 (1 ) tt t t B rB P L − − = −+  (5) 
where Bt is the bearing acreage in year t, which is equal to the value in the previous year 
less the amount removed in that year, which is defined by the proportional removal rate, 
rt (0.01 for years up to 2015, and 0.02 thereafter)  plus an increment equal to the number 
of trees planted in the year seven years previously.  
Yields per bearing acre vary over time reflecting both the alternate bearing habit 
of pistachios and the influence of other random variables, as well as trending up to reflect 
both technological improvements and the maturation of young bearing trees.  To capture 
these characteristics we used a trend model of the following form: 
  ( ) 0 (1 ) 1
t
tt Yy Y u =+ +  (6) 
where Yt is the projected yield per bearing acreage in year t, which is equal to the value in 
the base year, scaled up by exponential growth at a rate y, and adjusted by an annual 
proportional shock, ut
10.   
Production is simply the product of yield per bearing acre and the number of 
bearing acres:   
  . ttt QYB = ×  (7) 
                                                 
10 The values for ut were obtained by first computing the past values of year-to-year variations around trend 
yields.  We extended that series to a length of 100 observations by replicating the sequence, and then drew 
a series of 50 by selecting a starting point at random within the 100 observations.  This series represents 
one 50-year sequence of random shocks which, combined with equation (6), allows us to generate a single 
“future” of yields over 50 years.  Alternative futures were generated by drawing alternative starting points.  
A total of 100 such futures were generated and used in the simulation models.   13
Annual demand consists of two distinct markets, the domestic and the export 
market that are treated differently by the marketing order, as well as demand for changes 
in stocks.  We specified linear equations for quantities demanded on the domestic market 
(DDt), on the export market (DEt), and for storage (DSt), t years in the future, as a 
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Values for the slope and intercept parameters for each of these equations were estimated 
using elasticities and initial values for prices and quantities in the base year, using five-
year averages, 1997-2001.  Values for the growth rate parameters (d, e, and s), were 
chosen to reflect underlying growth rates in demand.  Initial values of these were chosen 
in view of the past trends in consumption, after allowance for the effects of trends in 
prices.  Values for the demand elasticities were based on a combination of our own 
econometric estimations, other econometric estimates in the literature, and judgment 
based on knowledge of the industry and some introspection.  When estimating models of 
demand for U.S. pistachios in aggregate, and for U.S. consumption, we obtained some 
reasonable results and plausible elasticities.  In a range of specifications, the overall 
elasticity was estimated as about -2, and the domestic elasticity as about -1.  These 
estimates are consistent with elasticities of demand for exports and storage of about -3, 
which are plausible.
11   
                                                 
11 We do not have in mind any specific formal model of storage behavior, except that the demand for stocks 
slopes down such that current stocks will be greater when the current price is lower – a view that is 
consistent with various models of storage behavior and its motivations.  Our limited econometric analysis 
found support for this view.  Storage response is important in our context, because increased storage may   14
The sum of the three elements of demand represents the total demand (i.e., Dt = 
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Then, substituting for Qt, we can solve for the market-clearing price, which we can 
substitute in turn into the equations for individual elements of demand, and for plantings, 
in a recursive process.  
Two measures of producer benefits associated with the policy are computed as 
differences, for any given scenario, and for each year of the simulation.  First, we 
compute the difference between the with- and without-marketing order simulations in 
gross revenue per bearing acre.  An alternative measure of producer benefits is the 
change in profit or producer surplus.  The explicit measurement of profit or producer 
surplus is difficult in a setting with dynamic supply response, and requires an explicit 
cost function, which we do not have.  Therefore, we devise an approximate measure of 
producer surplus, which is  
  [ ]
0 ln ln . tt t t PS R d R d Q ∆≈ −   (10) 
where superscript “0” in Rt denotes the gross revenue at time t without the marketing 
order case.  
Annual domestic consumer benefits are computed as changes in Marshallian 
consumer surplus, the area behind the domestic demand curve, reflecting the effects of 
                                                                                                                                                 
be an important mechanism for the industry to absorb a temporary demand shock.  Our representation of 
storage response is necessarily simple, but a better option than treating storage as exogenous and not 
relevant to the analysis of the consequences of a demand shock.   15
both price changes and shifts in the demand.  The annual national benefits are equal to 
the sum of producer and consumer benefits. 
The annual producer, consumer, and national benefits are discounted back and 
expressed in present value terms.  The producer benefit-cost ratio is computed as the ratio 
of the present value of producer net benefits divided by the present value of the producer 
incidence of the assessment to finance the policy.  Another index of the economic impact 
of the policy is the national benefit-cost ratio, computed as the present value of national 
benefits divided by the present value of the costs of the program (the cost of both the 
assessment to finance the program and other costs of compliance with the program), 
which is represented in the model by the cost of the assessment. 
Cost of Testing and other Compliance Issues 
The quantitative economic analysis requires information on the costs of aflatoxin 
testing and compliance with other quality standards as regulated under the marketing 
order.  Depending on the current level of testing and other characteristics, processing 
firms face different costs of complying with the proposed standards under the marketing 
order, in essence the cost for aflatoxin testing of pistachios destined for the domestic 
market and meeting quality standards.  A telephone conference with the seven major 
processors in California provided data on the cost that various processors of the 
California pistachio industry would face under the proposed marketing order (Pistachio 
Processor Group).   
In his testimony at the hearings on July 25, 2002, Daniel Sumner described in 
detail how to estimate these costs for three different types of processors, depending on 
their current testing practices and the size of their processing operation, based on labor   16
requirements and wage rates for inspectors, lot sizes, and various other factors.  The 
resulting estimate of the direct per unit cost of compliance was a weighted average 
(across the different types of processors) of $0.00525 per pound on the two-thirds of 
production to which the proposed marketing order rules apply.  This figure seems to be a 
consensus estimate in the industry.
12  The weighted cost of compliance applied across the 
entire California pistachio production is $0.0035 per pound.  These figures are based on 
an assumption that few undersized pistachios are currently sold in the standard market 
such that the implementation of the other features of the marketing order would not have 
significant implications for the total quantity available to the domestic market.
13  
Effects on the Probability of an Aflatoxin Event and its Consequences 
Direct evidence does not exist on the probability of an aflatoxin event that would 
cause a major negative shock to demand when it occurred, nor on the likely severity of 
the shock.  We assume that increased aflatoxin testing would reduce the probability of 
such an event, and may reduce the severity of the shock as well, but again we have no 
direct quantitative evidence on the relevant magnitudes.  To calibrate the potential effects 
of a pistachio food scare we used information from other produce-related food scares in 
the United States, along with information from an event involving pistachios in Germany, 
and we conducted sensitivity analyses in which we varied the relevant parameters.  
After the EU banned pistachio imports for three months in the last quarter of 1997 
because of aflatoxins, German imports remained substantially reduced over the next three 
                                                 
12 The Federal register (2003, p. 46017) reports “The average cost of compliance, as identified by several 
witnesses and reiterated in Dr. Sumner’s analysis, is approximately one half cent per pound of domestic 
pistachio production, or $0.00525 per pound.” 
 
13 In any event, under the marketing order, undersized pistachios could still be diverted to the export market 
and so the consequences of this element of the regulations for prices, quantities, and values would be 
negligible.   17
years, an estimated reduction in demand in the range of 40-50 percent.  The pistachio 
market is relatively small and other nuts and snack foods are likely to be close substitutes 
for pistachios.  This may be why the losses for pistachios in the EU market were larger 
than observed in some other food scares in the United States, but the differences also 
might reflect some differences between the United States and other countries – in terms 
of institutions and consumer behavior – which means the responses would be different.   
Taking a conservative approach, we assumed that an aflatoxin event in the 
domestic market for U.S. pistachios in year t would cause a 30 percent reduction in 
demand in the year of the event (i.e., δt = 0.3, where δ stands for the proportion by which 
demand decreases in year t).  The German evidence suggests that the negative demand 
effects from a single aflatoxin event would continue to affect demand for several years.  
The negative demand shock decays at a rate of 30 percent per year (i.e., δt+n = 0.7
nδt).  
Aflatoxin events do not happen every year, but the market always faces some 
probability of a food scare.  The benefit from additional testing is a reduction of the 
probability of an aflatoxin event or food scare.  For the current base case of no mandatory 
testing, we use an annual probability of 4 percent of an outbreak that affects demand as 
specified above.  We assumed that with mandatory testing the chance of an aflatoxin 
outbreak would fall to 2 percent and that the events, when they do occur, would have 
smaller effects on demand.  We assumed an initial downward shock of 15 percent with a 
marketing order rather than the 30 percent that would apply otherwise.  
Effects on Consumer and Buyer Confidence 
The demand for pistachios might be higher because of the official USDA 
certification ensuring a good quality product.  Many agricultural products take advantage   18
of USDA grading and other services (USDA, AMS).  Many consumers in the United 
States are well aware of USDA standards.  Buyers for major food outlets are familiar 
with USDA standards.  In general, USDA standard setting is thought to convey a positive 
benefit in a market as reflected by the use of this claim in product promotion, labels and 
display.  We are not aware, however, of empirical evidence of the magnitude of the 
impact of certification.  Here, we use a small increase in demand to reflect greater buyer 
confidence in pistachios due solely to the USDA’s participation in the standards process.  
In addition, but similarly, the demand for pistachios will be higher with 
mandatory minimum quality standards and better buyer perception of safety.  These 
standards would reflect well on the product as a whole and shift out demand for all 
pistachios because buyers would have lower probabilities of acquiring low quality 
shipments.  This demand effect also has two aspects.  The first is the general notion that 
buyers are willing to pay more for higher quality nuts.  Second, the minimum quality 
standard assures buyers that they have a smaller chance of a low-quality shipment.  This 
effect relies on more information being available to buyers that all pistachios from the 
marketing order area meet minimum standards.  One of the provisions under the proposed 
marketing order prohibits the sale of inferior pistachios.  Although these represent a tiny 
fraction of total production, removing them from the market altogether will result in an 
increase in the general quality of pistachios, albeit a small increase.  To reflect both of 
these elements, in the simulations we allow for a small increase in demand in every year, 
relative to the base case, in response to the introduction of the marketing order: an 
increase in U.S. consumers’ willingness to pay for pistachios equal to 1 cent per pound 
(about 1 percent of recent prices).   19
6.  Results of Benefit-Cost Analysis  
To estimate the impact of the marketing order we computed and compared a pair of fifty-
year simulations (i.e., one with and one without the marketing order) using the “baseline” 
values for the parameters, as shown in Table 1.  For each year of the fifty-year 
simulation, the model determines a market-clearing price, bearing acres, acres planted, 
yield, production, domestic quantity demanded, export quantity demanded, ending stocks, 
revenue, and consumer surplus.  To capture the effects of random yield variability and 
aflatoxin-related demand shocks, the 50 years of simulated equilibrium values were 
calculated for a set of 100 equally likely futures, which differ in terms of values for 
randomly generated yields and aflatoxin shocks.  Hence, in a given scenario, each 
simulated variable of interest has a fifty-year time path, with a random distribution in 
each period, which is affected by the marketing order.  It is important to keep this time 
path and the random nature of the variables in mind.
14    
Under the marketing order, as shown in Table 2, the annual probability of an 
aflatoxin event is reduced from 4 percent to 2 percent, and the demand impacts of such an 
event are assumed to be half as large (i.e., an initial drop of 15 percent in demand versus 
30 percent, applied to both the domestic market and relevant export markets).  In addition 
to this benefit the marketing order is assumed to increase the domestic consumers’ 
willingness to pay for pistachios by 1 cent per lb.  The cost of compliance with the 
marketing order, 0.525 cents per pound consumed domestically, is reflected as a 
reduction in the price to growers for domestic sales.  
                                                 
14 Further details on the simulation model and alternative parameterizations may be found in the more 
comprehensive full report on the study (Gray et al. 2004).   20
The impacts of the marketing order are reported in the first column of numbers in 
Table 2.  To summarize the effects of the marketing order over the 50-year simulation we 
report average effects over the 50 years for some variables and for others we report the 
net present value in 2003 of the effects over the 50 years.  The policy would modestly 
increase the average price received by growers (by 0.5 cents per pound, or 0.6 percent), 
along with the average number of bearing acres (by 1,870 acres or 1.3 percent) and 
production (by 12.6 million pounds per year or 1.5 percent).  These increases in 
production are associated generally with increases in domestic consumption (by 11.5 
million pounds per year or 2.8 percent) and in exports (by 1.0 million pounds per year or 
0.2 percent) and decreases in stocks (by 0.6 million pounds per year or 0.3 percent).  
These averages mask the fact that, as noted above, the effects on some of these variables 
change over time both because of trends (the production response to the policy increases 
with time whereas the domestic demand response begins immediately) and from year to 
year (through the interaction of policy-induced changes in bearing acreage and variable 
yields).  This is true in particular for the effects of the policy on exports – the small 
average effects reflect negative impacts in some years, especially initially, and positive 
impacts in others, especially in the later years.  
The dynamics of the impact of the marketing order on revenue per bearing acre, 
bearing acres, and domestic consumer surplus are particularly interesting.  The marketing 
order increases grower price and revenue per acre by increasing consumer confidence and 
reducing the odds and the impact of an aflatoxin event.  The impact on revenue is greatest 
in the first few years after the introduction of the marketing order because supply is 
unaffected for this period.  The increase in revenue per acre eventually causes an increase   21
in the time path of bearing acres.  The increase in bearing acres results in increased 
production, driving down prices and revenue per acre, and dissipating the benefits for 
producers.  Consumers gain initially from the improved food safety and these benefits are 
then augmented by the subsequent reductions in prices resulting from the increases in 
production.  
The net benefits from the policy – reflecting the consequences of both the 
assessment and regulations, and the demand and supply responses to them – are 
expressed as present values (in 2003) of changes in economic surplus accruing to 
different groups.  These net benefits include $68.9 million to domestic producers and 
$165.4 million to domestic consumers, yielding a total national net benefit of $234.2 
million.
15  From a global perspective, the U.S. net benefits are slightly offset by net losses 
in foreigner surplus (the “consumer surplus” measured off the demand for U.S. exports) 
worth $25.0 million, leaving global net benefits with a present value in 2003 equal to 
$209.2 million.
16  
We also estimated the total cost of the policy (in terms of expenditure incurred by 
processors in compliance), which had a present value in 2003 of $36.7 million.  The 
initial incidence of this cost is on processors, but this incidence is redistributed over time 
through supply and demand responses.  To evaluate the final incidence, we ran a 
                                                 
15 On 78,000 bearing acres in 2001, the producer benefit is worth $2,120 per acre, but the benefits would 
not be confined to these acres. 
 
16 The positive effect on export quantity seems to contradict the higher average price and the reduction in 
foreign “consumer” surplus associated with the policy.  The effect on foreign “consumer” surplus is 
complicated.  First, there are some benefits to foreigners from the policy because in the baseline, there is a 
spillover of an aflatoxin event from U.S. demand to foreign demand and the policy-induced reduction in 
probability and severity of an aflatoxin event applies to export markets as well as domestically.  These 
benefits are offset at least somewhat by the larger domestic demand responses, driving up prices, especially 
in the early years; in the later years those effects in turn are offset at least somewhat by the consequences of 
U.S. supply response to the policy.  The benefits to foreigners are greater in the earlier years, and given 
discounting, the net present value is negative even though the average effect on quantity of exports, 
undiscounted, is slightly positive.   22
simulation with just the assessment (modeled as a reduction in domestic buyers’ 
willingness to pay of 0.525 cents per pound) and, in present value terms, we found that 
15 percent of the cost was borne by growers, 85 percent by domestic and foreign 
consumers combined, and 95 percent by domestic consumers (foreign consumers are net 
beneficiaries of a tax on domestic consumers).  Hence the incidence of the global cost of 
$36.7 million was $39.7 million on the United States, including $5.5 million on U.S. 
producers.  By dividing each measure of net benefits by the corresponding measure of the 
incidence of the costs we obtained a ratio of net benefits to costs (i.e., (B-C)/C) to which 
we added one to compute conventional benefit-cost ratios (B/C) for domestic producers 
(13.5), the United States (6.9) and the world (6.7).  
To examine the general sensitivity of results to modeling assumptions, we devised 
a “high-impact” scenario and a “low-impact” scenario, and the summary results for the 
simulations under these scenarios are reported in second and third columns of numbers in 
Table 3.  For the high-impact scenario we altered most of the parameters of the model by 
10 percent in the direction that would increase the impact of the policy; for the low-
impact scenario we altered the parameters by 10 percent in the opposite direction.  These 
scenarios reveal how the results would be affected by a modest but consistent upward or 
downward bias in parameter values.  As shown at the bottom of the table the combined 
effect of the parameter changes creates a larger than 10 percent variation in the estimated 
impacts of the marketing order.  Compared with a benefit-cost ratio for producers of 13.5 
in the base scenario, the ratio is 20.8 (50 percent higher) in the high-impact scenario and 
9.6 (30 percent lower) in the low-impact scenario.  Similarly for the United States as a 
whole, compared with a benefit-cost ratio of 6.9 in the base scenario, the ratio is 10.2 (50   23
percent higher) in the high-impact scenario and 3.8 (45 percent lower) in the low-impact 
scenario.  Nevertheless, the benefit-cost ratios are all well greater than zero, even in the 
low-impact scenario, indicating that the policy entails substantial net benefits for both 
producers and the nation as a whole.  
7.  Conclusion 
An aflatoxin event could impose serious costs on the California pistachio industry.  The 
proposed marketing order is intended to reduce the odds of an event, to mitigate the 
consequences if an event should occur, and to provide some quality assurance to buyers, 
to offset the negative consequences of concerns over the potential for a food scare 
affecting pistachios.  In this study we have modeled the market for California pistachios 
to provide an ex ante assessment of the benefits and costs and other consequences of the 
proposed marketing order looking forward for 50 years from its likely introduction in 
2004.  Our approach uses a stochastic dynamic simulation of the industry under scenarios 
with and without the proposed marketing order in place, to compare the stream of 
simulated outcomes and the consequences for measures of economic welfare of 
producers in the industry, consumers, the nation as a whole, and globally.  
To assess the implications of the marketing order required incorporating into the 
simulation a number of parameters representing the odds of an aflatoxin event, its 
consequences for demand, and the extent to which a marketing order would reduce those 
magnitudes.  Many of these parameters are hard to estimate because relevant historical 
data are not available on pistachios.  As well as simulating the consequences implied by 
“best-guess” values for key parameters, we undertook sensitivity analysis.  Across the 
full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always   24
favorable to the policy: the measured benefits to producers, the nation, or the world 
always well exceeded the corresponding measure of costs, typically by many times.  The 
benefit-cost ratios were generally greater than 5:1 and often greater than 10:1, which 
means there is substantial leeway to accommodate potential errors in assumptions and yet 
have favorable findings.  In present value terms, the benefits to producers were estimated 
at $68.9 million.  Two-thirds of the benefits, $165.4 million would accrue to domestic 
consumers.  These are significant values, and are large relative to the cost of compliance 
with the program, which is a very small amount – about half of one percent of the current 
value of domestic sales.    25
Table 1: Key Parameters for the Simulation Model 
Parameter  Baseline 
Value 
Underlying Market Conditions   
  Elasticity of domestic demand   -1.00 
  Elasticity of export demand   -3.30 
  Elasticity of demand for stocks  -2.00 
  Long-run annual growth rate of demand (percent)  3.60 
  Elasticity of new plantings response to profitability  1.00 
   
Impact Parameters without a Marketing Order   
  Probability of an aflatoxin event (percent per year)  4.00 
  Initial impacts of an event (percentage reduction in domestic demand)  30.00 
  Foreign demand shock/ domestic demand shock (percent)  21.50 
   
Impact Parameters with a Marketing Order   
  Probability of an aflatoxin event (percent per year)  2.00 
  Initial impacts of an event (percentage reduction in domestic demand)  15.00 
  Initial impacts of an event (percentage reduction in foreign demand)  21.50 
  Compliance costs (cents per pound)  0.525 
  Domestic demand enhancement from certification (cents per pound)  1.00 
   
 
Table 2: Simulation Results: Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Pistachio Marketing Order 




Average of Annual Values, 2000-2050, Induced Changes in      
  Price of California pistachios (real cents per pound)  0.501  0.726  0.371 
  Bearing area of California pistachios (acres)  1,866  2,716  1,279 
  Production of California pistachios (million pounds)  12.55  18.31  8.63 
  Domestic consumption of California pistachios (million pounds)  11.54  16.91  8.15 
  Exports of California pistachios (million pounds)  1.01  1.40  0.51 
  Stocks of California pistachios (million pounds)  -0.62  -1.05  -0.47 
Present Values in Year 2000, Net Benefits, $million     
  Changes in U.S. consumer surplus (CS)  165.4  246.7  109.8 
  Changes in California producer surplus (PS)  68.9  103.7  49.6 
  National benefits (NS = CS+PS)  234.3  350.4  159.4 
  Net changes in foreign surplus (FS)  -25.0  -36.5  -19.2 
  Global net benefits (GS = NS+FS)  209.3  313.9  140.2 
Present Values in Year 2003, Costs of Marketing Order, $million     
  Cost of compliance (CC)  36.7  34.9  38.4 
Benefit-Cost Ratios     
  Global B/C ratio (1+ [GS/CC])  6.7  10.0  4.7 
  National B/C ratio (1 + [NS/1.1CC])  6.9  10.2  4.8 
  Grower B/C ratio (1+ PS/0.15CC])  13.5  20.8  9.6 
        26
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